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RISK AND THE STRATEGY OF FOREIGN LOCATION CHOICE
IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES

SUMMARY

While firms operating in regulated industries seek to avoid countries with high
levels of macroeconomic uncertainty, they find it more attractive to expand into countries
characterized by governments with discretionary policymaking capacities because they
benefit from negotiating favorable conditions of entry. Firms in which the state holds a
partial equity stake exhibit more tolerant attitudes towards both macroeconomic uncertainty
and the policy risks derived from dealing with discretionary governments. Support for these
ideas is provided by an analysis of the Latin American investments of all listed Spanish
firms in regulated industries between 1987 and 2000.

KEYWORDS

Policy risk, foreign location choice, political strategy, regulated industries.
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INTRODUCTION

Firms seek to formulate strategies conducive to superior performance taking into
account not only market but also political factors (Baron, 1995; Hillman and Hitt, 1999;
Bonardi et al., 2005). Government policy is relevant to strategy formulation given its
influence on the demand and supply of goods and services, which can be altered by a wide
array of regulations, including product standards, production requirements, excise taxes,
pricing guidelines, and entry and exit rules, to name but a few. While regulation has come
to affect virtually every sector of the economy, the so-called “regulated” industries (e.g.
telecommunications, electricity, water, oil, gas, and banking) are subject to an unusual
degree of intervention and policy risk. In these industries governments have the ability to
dramatically alter the profitability of firms (Henisz, 2000; Henisz and Zelner, 2001).
Strategy scholars have long recognized that firms in such industries require specific
theoretical and empirical analysis (Mahon and Murray, 1981; Reger et al., 1992), especially
when it comes to studying their patterns of international expansion and their exposure to
regulatory risk in different countries (Bonardi, 2004; Henisz and Zelner, 2005).
During the last two decades, the predicament of firms in regulated industries has
changed substantially. Until the 1980s they enjoyed what can be described as a “quiet life”
(Hicks, 1935) due to their oligopolistic and even monopolistic advantages stemming from
regulation and/or technology. Over the last twenty years, however, globalization,
deregulation, privatization and technical change have altered their domestic competitive
environment in substantial ways. International expansion has been a frequent response to
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these challenges, as they sought to compensate falling margins in their deregulating home
market by entering foreign markets where regulations kept margins at higher than
competitive levels (Sarkar et al., 1999; Bonardi, 2004).
Firms in regulated industries face a significant dilemma when expanding abroad. On
the one hand, established theory and practice recommend following a gradual, staged model
of international expansion so as to minimize risks and cope with uncertainty (Johanson and
Vahlne, 1977; Chang, 1995; Rivoli and Salorio, 1996; Guillén, 2002; Vermeulen and
Barkema, 2002), that is, to overcome the so-called liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1960;
Zaheer, 1995). On the other, the regulated nature of these industries tends to require a
strong commitment of resources and a fast pace of entry into foreign markets. This is the
case for three interrelated reasons. First, these industries tend to be highly concentrated, and
often they exhibit certain features of the “natural monopoly.”1 Second, entry may be
restricted by the government, frequently under a system of licenses. And third, the
government may own significant parts of the industry. Under these circumstances, foreign
entrants face strong incentives to commit large amounts of resources and to establish
operations quickly, whenever and wherever opportunities arise, and frequently via
acquisition as opposed to greenfield investment (Sarkar et al., 1999). Thus, the regulated
and oligopolistic nature of these industries generates strong first-mover advantages (Doh,
2000; Knickerbocker, 1973).
1

A natural monopoly emerges when it is possible to exploit economies of scale over a very

large range of output. As a result, the optimally efficient scale of production becomes a
very high proportion of the total market demand for the product or service.

4

Recent research argues that firms in regulated industries follow “asymmetric
strategies” in that they seek to defend their home-country position by preventing rivals
from competing on a level playing field while pursuing entry into foreign markets as
deregulation occurs. Given that deregulation has taken place at different moments in time
and to different degrees from country to country, firms in regulated industries tend to
follow a multidomestic strategy of foreign expansion, namely, they pick and choose which
markets to enter depending on the specific circumstances present in each foreign country,
arranging their operations with a local rather than a global logic in mind and engaging in
limited cross-border coordination (Bonardi, 2004). Another distinctive feature of regulated
industries is the role of the state as a shareholder. Some of the most active firms in
regulated industries expanding abroad are former monopolies in which the state has or has
had a controlling stake (Doh et al., 2004).
In the next section we develop a theory of the effect of macroeconomic and policy
risks on foreign location choice in the context of regulated industries. We build on
Bonardi’s (2004) insight that, when expanding abroad, firms in regulated industries tend to
follow a multidomestic strategy, negotiating separately for each market entry and arranging
their operations as compartmentalized national organizations. We also examine the effect
that equity control by the state has over their attitudes toward policy risk. Our point of
departure is the well-established observation in the literature that firms in regulated (and
concentrated) industries invest less in countries characterized by high macroeconomic and
political risks (Henisz and Zelner, 2001). We test our predictions with data on the
investment decisions of the 25 Spanish listed firms in regulated industries between 1987
and 2000.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Established economic theory posits that the multinational enterprise (MNE) exists
as a consequence of failures in the market for firm-specific competencies, whether
technological or marketing-related (Caves, 1996; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart,
1982; Teece, 1977). A superficial analysis of the evidence would suggest that this theory is
not applicable to the phenomenon of MNEs from regulated industries such as utilities or
telecommunications due to the facts that they generally lack proprietary technology and that
their marketing abilities have not been fully developed because they have enjoyed a
position of market power in the home country. However, recent research shows that these
firms are trying to replicate in foreign countries the same advantages enjoyed in the home
country and/or the experience accumulated at running the business (Sarkar et al., 1999;
Guillén, 2005). For instance, they may invest abroad so as to exploit some valuable firmspecific resource like the ability to manage relationships with regulators and customers
(Boddewiyn and Brewer, 1994; Henisz, 2003; Bonardi, 2004; Henisz and Zelner, 2005) or
the ability to execute projects efficiently and in due course (Amsden and Hikino, 1994).
Therefore, firms in regulated industries lacking technologies and marketing know-how may
still expand abroad on the basis of other useful, firm-specific skills.
Similarly, received theory concerning foreign location choice indicates that MNEs
pick and choose where and when to exploit their proprietary advantages depending on
location-specific opportunities and risks (Dunning, 1988; Rivoli and Salorio, 1996).
Holding constant for the opportunities, the received wisdom is that MNEs seek to minimize
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the risks, entering macroeconomically and politically “safe” countries and avoiding
problematic ones (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Henisz and Delios, 2001). Although
international expansion always entails risks, regulated firms are unusually exposed because
of both the large size of their investments and their dependence on the host-country
government for munificent regulations (Henisz and Zelner, 2001). Below we follow the
extant literature in analyzing economic and policy risks separately, but we arrive at
somewhat different predictions. We also consider the moderating effect of state ownership
on the foreign investing firm’s response to economic and policy risks in the host country,
given the fact that many firms in regulated industries are wholly or partly owned by the
state.

Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Foreign Expansion
The literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions highlights that firms
prefer to invest in markets with low levels of macroeconomic uncertainty, especially those
undertaking horizontal, i.e. market-seeking, investments (Dunning, 1993). The reason is
that if the firm sets up operations in the foreign country in order to service the local market,
unexpected variations in GDP growth rates and other macroeconomic magnitudes will
make it more difficult for it to plan and to manage its investments. Most foreign
investments by firms in regulated industries tend to be horizontal in nature, for they are
undertaken as a necessary condition to be able to sell in the local market.
A specialized branch of the literature on international investment decisions known
as the hysteresis hypothesis shows that when faced by uncertainty in the economic
environment the best strategy is to “wait and see” (Dixit, 1989, 1992). Building on this
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literature, Rivoli and Salorio (1996) argue that even firms with valuable assets and useful
knowledge may postpone investments in countries characterized by economic uncertainty.
Having such valuable knowledge, these firms can delay the investment because of the
monopoly they have over it. Although not conclusive, there is some empirical evidence
showing that firms tend to avoid investments in countries with high economic uncertainty,
especially if the size of the investment is large (Campa, 1993). Given that regulated
industries usually entail large initial capital outlays (Sarkar et al., 1999), we expect that
foreign investors will tend to avoid countries with high macroeconomic uncertainty.
Several executives of the Spanish companies included in our sample for analysis are on
record arguing that they prefer to avoid countries with macroeconomic uncertainty
(Ontiveros et al., 2004: 19).2 Thus, we predict that:

Hypothesis 1: The greater the macroeconomic uncertainty in the host
country, the less foreign firms will invest.

Policy Stability, Host-Government Discretion and Foreign Expansion
Although much of the literature dealing with country risk has traditionally analyzed
financial and economic variables, e.g. foreign exchange volatility or macroeconomic
uncertainty (Click, 2003), during the last decade empirical research has turned to analyzing
2

See also Manuel Pizarro Moreno, President of the Association of Spanish Savings Banks,

Diario de Sesiones del Senado: Comisión de Asuntos Iberoamericanos 186 (October 17,
2001):20.
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the impact of host governments on FDI decisions. The concept of “policy instability” refers
to the likelihood that the government might change the rules of the game in a way that
adversely affects the interests of the foreign direct investor. In general, firms prefer the
government to be credibly committed to a set of policies and rules because that reduces the
risk of investing (Murtha and Lenway, 1994; Murtha, 1991; Henisz, 2000; Henisz and
Zelner, 2005). The literature also points out that governments are more credible in their
commitment when their actions are constrained by institutional checks and balances which
make unilateral changes less likely. The idea is that when the executive branch of
government is not constrained in its decision-making by other branches or institutions
within the host country (e.g. the legislature or the judiciary), there is a greater possibility of
negatively affecting the performance of foreign direct investments (Knack and Keefer,
1995). The chain of reasoning thus starts with the observation of the fact that governments
differ in the extent to which they enjoy discretion in decision-making, which in turn
reduces the credibility of their commitments, and ultimately increases the degree of policy
instability affecting investors. Institutionally constrained governments are more credible,
thus reducing uncertainty in the eyes of the foreign investor (Murtha and Lenway, 1994;
Henisz, 2000; Henisz and Williamson, 1999). Previous research by Henisz and Delios
(2001) has demonstrated that firms prefer to avoid countries with high levels of policy
instability.
Although policy instability potentially affects firms in any industry, its influence is
especially relevant in the case of regulated sectors (Sarkar et al., 1999). Host governments
can introduce general policy changes of an economic or fiscal kind. More specifically, they
can affect prices and investment incentives in industries in which they have the authority to
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regulate such matters, or can expropriate the assets of firms. For these reasons, firms
operating in regulated industries will tend to minimize the risk they are assuming by
investing only in countries where the stability of policymaking inspires enough confidence
in them to commit to an investment.
Several of the top executives of the Spanish firms included in our sample for
analysis have over the years emphasized that they prefer to operate in host countries in
which the executive branch of government, which regulates their activities, is subject to
legislative and judicial controls, i.e. where there is, in their own words, “political stability”
(Ontiveros et al., 2004: 4). For instance, in hearings at the Spanish Senate, the President of
Endesa, the world’s 8th largest electrical utility and a major investor in Latin America,
equated “certainty” with “the rule of law” and with an “impeccable institutional
functioning.” “Most of our difficulties in Latin America have had to do with regulatory
uncertainty.”3 Top executives of Gas Natural and electrical utilities Iberdrola and Unión
Fenosa clearly indicated in their own writings that their companies prefer low regulatory
risk (Brufau Niubó, 2002; Azagra Blázquez, 2002; Prieto Iglesias, 2002). In a prominent
example, the Bolivia country manager for Repsol-YPF, the world’s ninth largest oil
company, explained that government plans to change existing investment rules for
companies operating in the country were “confiscatory” in that firms like his own had
invested assuming certain conditions (International Gas Report, 24 September 2004).
Further evidence of companies’ preference for policy stability comes from Telefónica’s
3

Rodolfo Martín Villa, President of Endesa, Diario de Sesiones del Senado: Comisión de

Asuntos Iberoamericanos 155 (June 26, 2001):33.
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reaction to the Peruvian government’s unilateral decision to slash rates by 10 percent in
2004. The head of the local subsidiary noted that “we trust the regulator will reconsider its
decision so that we can continue with our planned investments and persuade our
shareholders that investing in Latin America is worthwhile” (Expansión, 12 August 2004).
Given foreign direct investors’ preference for policy stability, we predict:

Hypothesis 2a: The less institutionally constrained the executive branch of
government in the host country, the greater the policy instability and
accordingly the less foreign firms will invest.

Recent research on the international expansion of firms in regulated industries,
however, challenges the notion that countries with high levels of policy instability are
unattractive to foreign investors. Companies in regulated industries tend to pursue
“asymmetric” strategies (Bonardi, 2004). On the one hand, they seek to protect their market
position in the home market through political influence, i.e. they employ a defensive
political strategy. On the other, they wish to enter foreign markets, though only if they can
obtain special treatment relative to their competitors, i.e. they employ an aggressive
economic and political strategy in foreign countries. Moreover, governments around the
world have allowed foreign entry at different points in time, and often under vastly
different operating conditions.
As a result, foreign investing firms in these industries tend to adopt a multidomestic,
one-country-at-a-time approach to foreign expansion (Bonardi, 2004). This type of strategy
works best if the foreign entrant negotiates directly with the host country government and
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obtains preferential treatment, something that can be more easily accomplished if the
executive branch is not constrained by the veto power of the other branches, that is, when
policy discretion is high. Research has documented that technological or marketing skills
are not as important in regulated industries as the ability to deal with governments and
regulators (Henisz, 2003; Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Lyles and Steensma, 1996).
The paradox about these asymmetric strategies is that while the foreign investor
would prefer a constrained executive branch during the operational phase of the investment,
i.e. a government or regulator who cannot easily change the rules of the game, at the time
of entry the foreign investor prefers a politically unconstrained executive branch in the host
country so that they can obtain preferential treatment.
Not surprisingly, the Spanish MNEs in regulated industries seem to value direct
access to host governments, especially institutionally unconstrained ones. For instance, the
President of Agbar—one of the world’s largest multinational water utilities—candidly
shared with senators during a hearing that “another surprise we came across in South
America was that authorities are much more approachable than in Spain or Europe. I can
tell you that in [Latin American] countries similar to Spain in terms of population, one
finds it easier to meet with a cabinet minister; it is even easier to change the appointment
time. This is not as easy in Spain, and it is likely not easy either in France or Germany.”4
In addition of the advantages of negotiating special treatment with an institutionally
unconstrained government, managers of regulated firms also point out that privatization
4

Ricardo Fornesa Ribó, President and CEO of Aguas de Barcelona, Diario de Sesiones del

Senado: Comisión de Asuntos Iberoamericanos 148 (June 12, 2001):3.

12

processes—which offer opportunities for foreigners to enter foreign markets—are less
likely to occur when the executive branch is subject to the checks and balances of the other
branches. For instance, the President of electrical utility Endesa suggested that, although
during the operative phase of their foreign investments his company preferred governments
with little discretion (as predicted by hypothesis 2a above), the reverse was true during the
time leading up to initial entry: “The other big opportunity [besides Brazil] lies in Mexico,
but […] the privatization of Mexican firms requires a constitutional amendment […] We
shall see whether during the upcoming official visit of the [Spanish] Head of Government
to Mexico we receive some signals regarding this issue, although I do not think it will
happen immediately.”5 Executives at Repsol-YPF made the same point concerning the
possibility of privatizations in the oil industry (Corporate Mexico, 22 October 2004).
The corollary to the preceding arguments is that firms in regulated industries would
prefer to expand throughout the world with a global strategy in mind, but the different
moments and ways in which governments make it possible for them to enter and to operate
require a country-by-country negotiation and strategy. As a result, the managers of firms in
regulated industries have a preference for striking deals that offer them a political
advantage, both in terms of gaining entry into the country and in terms of operating
conditions. They see the advantages of an institutionally unconstrained executive that can
help them gain entry under favorable conditions, notwithstanding the possibility that the
5

Rodolfo Martín Villa, President of Endesa, Diario de Sesiones del Senado: Comisión de

Asuntos Iberoamericanos 155 (June 26, 2001):32. At the time of writing, Mexico had not
yet privatized electricity.
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rules of the game might change precisely because the executive is not subject to checks and
balances. In their calculation, the benefits of preferential entry under munificent conditions
exceed the potential damages that might obtain if the executive unilaterally changes
operating conditions in the future, such as prices, regulations concerning new entrants,
investment requirements, and so on. Hence, we argue that in regulated industries,
institutionally constrained executive governments are not in the best interest of firms:

Hypothesis 2b: In regulated industries, the less institutionally constrained
the executive branch of government in the host country, the greater the
policymaking discretion and accordingly the more foreign firms will invest.

State Ownership and Foreign Expansion. Firms are heterogeneous in their
attitudes toward risk. Social influences and organizational control systems condition the
way in which decision makers perceive and take risks (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). A key
characteristic of firms in regulated industries is whether they are state owned or not. A large
body of literature indicates that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibit a different
propensity to take risks. Compared to publicly listed firms, SOEs are not subject to the
discipline of the stock market. Moreover, they can borrow money on better terms because
the state is ultimately responsible for their finances. Many countries around the world
historically adopted the practice of using the state’s budget to fund the investments of SOEs
and to cover their (frequent) losses. As a result of their lack of accountability and the
backing of the state, SOEs have traditionally tended to be less efficient than publicly listed
companies (see Meggison and Netter, 2001 for a review of the empirical literature).
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State ownership is also associated with inferior operating and financial performance
because managers must pursue not only purely economic goals but also political ones, and
there is no specific principal or owner in charge of monitoring (Sheshinski and LópezCalva, 2003). Managers of wholly state-owned firms can rest assured that their financial
underperformance relative to other comparable firms will not endanger their tenure as long
as they successfully pursue the other goals imposed on them by the state.
Our analysis of the attitudes toward risk of the managers of SOEs focuses on the
framing of foreign investment decisions. We borrow from prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), which posits that behavior towards risk
changes with the framing of the situation. When it comes to international expansion, we
argue that firms partially owned by the state have a different attitude towards risk than
firms wholly owned by the state. The managers of firms wholly owned by the state and not
undergoing a privatization process tend to have little interest in restructuring, investing
abroad or introducing radical strategic changes (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Zhara et al.,
2000). They have little to gain from such actions and much to lose: their position in the
domestic market seems assured, and they must pursue political in addition to financial
goals.
As a firm owned by the state undergoes partial privatization, its incumbent
managers are confronted with a different type of situation. The literature documents that the
new shareholders tend to push SOE managers to more aggressive strategies in order to
improve financial performance, especially if some of the equity becomes publicly listed
(Zhara et al., 2000; Gupta, 2005; Roland and Sekkat, 2000). As a result, the incumbent
management team members may fear losing their job if they do not deliver better results. In
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fact, privatization processes, even partial ones, frequently bring about the replacement of
incumbent managers (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000), and in some countries as many as half
of former SOE managers fail to get a job in the private sector subsequent to their dismissal
(Gupta, 2005).
Our argument is that the incumbent managers of a partially privatized SOE tend to
frame the situation confronting them in a different way than the managers of firms fully
owned by the state. They face the possibility of an important loss—being fired. According
to prospect theory, people are much less risk averse when it comes to minimizing or
avoiding losses than when they seek to lock in gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In a
situation of partial privatization, incumbent managers will downplay the risks of major
strategic changes (including foreign expansion) in order to play to the interests of new
shareholders and thus enhance their chances of staying on the job. Recent theoretical and
empirical research on privatization shows that managers prepare themselves for
privatization by restructuring their companies (Roland and Sekkat, 2000), and that partially
privatized firms invest more in fixed assets. Our prediction is that the managers of partially
privatized SOEs will perceive the risks associated with macroeconomic uncertainty and
policy instability in the foreign countries in which they might potentially invest as being
lower or more easily tractable than the managers of either firms fully owned by the state or
firms in which the state holds no equity. Therefore, we formulate:

Hypothesis 3: As macroeconomic uncertainty and policy instability increase,
firms in regulated industries that are partially owned by the state will invest
more than other types of firms.
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EMPIRICAL SETTING, DATA AND METHOD

Empirical Setting
We focus our analysis on the Latin American investments of the 25 Spanish
companies in banking, electricity, water, oil and gas, and telecommunications. Most of
these firms are among the biggest in the world in their respective industries. For instance,
the largest Spanish telecommunications (Telefónica), electricity (Endesa, Iberdrola) and oil
(Repsol) companies are among the top 12 within their respective industries as ranked in the
Fortune Global 500 list, and the biggest Spanish banks (BBVA, Santander) among the top
25. Most of the foreign investments of these companies have taken place in Latin America,
due to a variety of cultural, economic and timing factors (Guillén, 2005). This empirical
setting provides an excellent opportunity for studying the impact of risk aversion and
imitation in regulated industries, for the following reasons. First, Spanish firms in regulated
industries have been among the largest foreign direct investors in the world. Overall, Spain
ranks as the 7th largest foreign direct investor, behind France, the U.S., the U.K., Germany,
the Netherlands and Canada, and ahead of Japan, South Korea, Italy or Sweden (UNCTD,
2004: 306). Second, prior to the late 1980s, foreign direct investments made by these firms
were negligible due to the inward-looking character of the Spanish economy, making it
possible to avoid left censoring problems altogether. Third, these industries have undergone
a rapid process of deregulation starting in the late 1980s. Firms reacted to this change by
pursuing foreign opportunities, especially in Latin America. Thus, Spanish firms in these
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industries tried to replicate in Latin America the same advantages they had once enjoyed in
the home country (Guillén, 2005). Finally, Latin American countries differ substantially in
terms of the economic and political risks that they pose to foreign investors.

Data
Given that we seek to predict the occurrence of investments in specific foreign
countries, the unit of observation is the firm-country-year. We took into consideration the
foreign direct investments in a Latin American country undertaken by the 25 Spanish
publicly listed firms in banking, electricity, water, oil and gas, and telecommunications that
were included in the Madrid Stock Exchange’s General Index during the second half of the
eighties. Some of these firms were formerly wholly owned by the state, although by 1990
all of the state owned companies in the aforementioned industries where, at least, partially
privatized and listed on the Madrid Stock Market (Vergés, 1999). Most of the foreign direct
investments conducted by the firms in our sample were acquisitions of controlling stakes in
existing companies, frequently as the result of privatization. We compiled information on
each investment occurred between the beginning of 1987 and the end of 2000. If in a given
firm-country-year combination no investment occurred, our dependent variable was coded
as zero. Otherwise, it was coded as a nonnegative integer, depending on the number of
investments that took place.
Our main source of information was the Prensa Baratz press database. This database
includes all of the economic news published in all Spanish newspapers. Specifically, we
introduced iteratively the name of each Latin American country, the name of each
company, and the terms “investment,” “subsidiary,” “joint venture,” or “acquisition.” We
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also searched each company’s annual reports and web pages. We identified 190
investments in Latin American countries during the period under consideration, whose
distribution is shown in Table 1.
____________________________________
Table 1 about here
____________________________________

Our independent variables were constructed as follows. First, we measured policy
instability using Henisz’s (2000) POLCON V index of political constraints, which ranges
between 0 (no constraints on the executive’s power to introduce policy changes) and 1 (full
constraints). We substracted the constraints index from unity in order to use it as a measure
of policy instability or governmental policymaking discretion. Second, we used Servén’s
(1998) methodology for measuring macroeconomic uncertainty as the natural logarithm of
the conditional variance of nominal GDP growth fitted by using a generalized conditional
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) specification. These two variables were lagged one year in all
analyses. Third, we measured full state ownership as a dummy variable taking a value of 1
if the state held all of the equity in the company at the end of the year preceding the
investment, and 0 otherwise, and similarly partial state ownership when the state held some
equity but not all of it. The information to build these two variables was obtained from
Vergés (1999).
In addition to firm, host-country, industry and year fixed effects, we also used a
series of time-varying control variables. At the country level, all regressions include: GDP
in constant 1995 dollars to account for the size of the host country’s economy; the GDP
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growth rate to control for the business cycle; total inward foreign direct investment flows as
a percentage of GDP to control for the overall attractiveness of the country to foreign
investors; and imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP to account for openness to
trade. These variables were obtained from the World Bank. At the firm level, we controlled
for each firm’s previous investments in any Latin American country and for inflationadjusted total revenues. All of these variables were lagged one year. We also included a
time-varying dummy to indicate whether the country had initiated the process of
implementing market-oriented reforms, including privatization and deregulation, at the time
the investment was made. The information to build this variable was obtained from Lora
(2000) and from various press reports.

Method
The dependent variable is the count of foreign direct investments in each unique
firm-country-year combination, which is nonnegative, integer-valued, overdispersed, and
longitudinal. When the outcome variable is nonnegative and integer-valued, Poisson
regression is more appropriate than ordinary least squares. To adjust for overdispersion, we
used the negative binomial model, a generalization of the Poisson model in which the
assumption of equal mean and variance is relaxed (Hausman et al., 1984; Cameron and
Trivedi, 1998). Finally, we dealt with the longitudinal character of the data with firm fixed
effects. Missing data on one or more of the independent variables reduced the effective
sample for analysis to 4,198 observations. The fixed-effects sample spans 21 potential host
countries in which the firm could potentially invest and 14 years. We use the “fixedeffects” specification of Hausman et al. (1984), which includes a time-invariant variance-
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to-mean ratio for each firm (Allison and Waterman, 2005). Due to the fixed effects
specification of our models, the number of firms in our sample fell from 25 to 14, those that
invested at least once in Latin America during the period of study.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. Given the high
correlation between each of the interaction terms calculated to test the last hypothesis and
the main effects, we mean-centered the relevant continuous variables (policy instability and
macroeconomic uncertainty) before calculating the interactions. Following established
practice, the dichotomous main effects (full or partial state ownership) were not centered
(Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003).

____________________________________
Table 2 about here
____________________________________

RESULTS

Table 3 reports the results from fixed-effects negative binomial regressions using
four different specifications: control variables only, main effects added, hypothesized
interaction effects added, and control interaction effects added. The results are consistent
across specifications. The prediction that firms invest less as macroeconomic uncertainty
increases (hypothesis 1) receives support. Firms invest more, not less, as political checks
and balances invest (in support of hypothesis 2b and in contradiction of 2a), indicating that
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chances and conditions of entry improve as a result of the presence of an institutionally
unconstrained executive branch enjoying policymaking discretion. We find some support
for hypothesis 3 in that firms partially owned by the state invest more as macroeconomic
uncertainty and policy instability increase, although the latter interaction effect is
significant at the .09 level only. However, we do not find the main effect of partial state
ownership to be a significant predictor. It is important to note that the two interaction terms
included as additional controls in the fully specified model (those involving full state
ownership) are not significant, lending further credence to our argument that it is partially
privatized firms which are most likely to respond favorably to rising economic and political
risk in foreign countries.
____________________________________
Table 3 about here
____________________________________

The effects are not only statistically significant and robust to changing
specifications but also large in magnitude. Using the fixed-effects coefficient estimates
from the fully specified model in Table 3, a one-half standard deviation increase in
macroeconomic uncertainty would lead to a 35.9 percent decrease in the number of foreign
direct investments ({exp[-1.02 × 0.873 × 0.5]-1}×100), and a 41.6 percent increase in the
case of policy instability (or policymaking discretion). Firms partially owned by the state
invest only 21.4 percent less (as opposed to 35.8 for the average firm in the sample) in
response to a one-half standard deviation increase in macroeconomic uncertainty, that is,
they perceive this risk as being less important. Also, they invest 51.3 percent more (as
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opposed to 41.7 percent for the average firm) in response to a one-half standard deviation
increase in policy instability, which also indicates that they minimize the importance of this
other type of risk to a greater extent than other types of firms.
Concerning control variables, only openness to foreign direct investment and trade
turned out to be significant. Reform, company sales, company previous investments, GDP
and GDP growth failed to reach significance in the fully specified model.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Our empirical results indicate that firms operating in regulated industries respond
differently than other types of firms to the presence of risks in foreign locations.
Specifically, the firms in our sample exhibited different attitudes toward different types of
risk. They were definitely averse to macroeconomic uncertainty, like firms from other
industries. However, over the years they displayed a preference to enter countries with
discretionary governments, most likely because they place more value on the advantages
that can be obtained at entry than on the risk that can potentially hurt their operations if the
government changes the rules of the game subsequent to committing the investment.
Moreover, firms partially owned by the state behaved in a less risk-averse way than other
types of firms in that they invested more as macroeconomic uncertainty or policy instability
increased. This empirical evidence is fully consistent with a view of firms in regulated
industries emphasizing their need to deal effectively with the local government (Lyles and
Steensma, 1996), and to pursue asymmetric strategies (Bonardi, 2004).

23

One possible alternative explanation for our findings is that SOEs are sometimes
charged by governments with the task of investing abroad so as to prepare the ground for
other types of firms to follow suit. This effect has been documented for the Spanish case
(Casanova, 2002; Guillén, 2005). However, our statistical results are not fully consistent
with this alternative view. While it might be true that being less averse to political risk
could be the artifact of a government directive to “show the way” to other firms, the result
that partially privatized firms are less risk averse than other types of firms, including those
wholly owned by the state, contradicts this alternative explanation. Firms wholly owned by
the state should be found to be more likely to serve as the leading foreign investors.
A more cynical reading of our empirical results would be that firms in regulated
industries prefer governments with discretionary power because it is easier to lobby or to
bribe them. Firms in any industry, and especially in regulated ones, value having direct
access to government officials and being able to come to agreements with them without the
interference of other veto players such as the legislature or the judiciary. Our results cannot
rule out this alternative explanation. Managers of partially privatized firms could well be
more willing to engage in backstage deals in order to obtain better financial returns even in
situations in which they expose themselves to a higher risk of policy reversal. One possible
way of reconciling this possibility with our theoretical framework is to argue that managers
factor into their decisions the benefits and the costs of dealing with institutionally
unconstrained executive branches of government, including the advantages of privileged
entry conditions and the associated higher probability of future policy reversals. Whatever
the case may be, our results confirm the argument that, when expanding abroad, firms
operating in regulated industries exploit their knowledge and skills in dealing with
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governments and regulators. Although these firms usually lack technological or marketing
capabilities, they know how to deal with governments and how to operate in a regulated
context (Henisz, 2003). For this reason, high policy instability is not a barrier impossible to
overcome for these firms. An illustration of this argument comes from Telefónica’s recent
negotiations with the Argentine government, which the company is pursuing aggressively
in order to ensure that regulatory conditions do not change adversely to its interests as a
new Law of Public Utilities and a revised Law of Telecommunications are being drafted
(Expansión, 27 August 2005).
Our study is limited in several respects. We analyzed a specific context: investments
undertaken by Spanish regulated firms in Latin America. Although we have a detailed data
set including all of their investments, our results may not be entirely generalizable to
regulated firms from other home countries investing in other host regions. In addition, this
paper has not taken into account information regarding entry mode, i.e. whether the
investing firm was the only investor or not. Delios and Henisz (2000) show how firms
adapt the percent equity ownership of their FDIs to deal with foreign risks. Finally, we have
analyzed the decision to invest, without studying the post-investment performance and its
effects on subsequent investments. The rapid growth of Spanish FDI in Latin America
during the last decade has allowed us to obtain very rich data to analyze the relationships
among risk, imitation and the location of FDI. However, this rapid growth may have had
negative consequences for some of these firms, as time compression diseconomies may
emerge when the firm has a fast foreign expansion pace (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). It
seems, therefore, that further research using data from other industries and countries, and
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taking into account entry mode and performance could shed more light into these
controversial issues.
Despite these limitations, our theoretical and empirical analysis advances the
existing literature in two key ways. First, we document that, while regulated firms prefer to
operate in countries characterized by policy stability, they are even more attracted to the
advantages that might be obtained from negotiating entry on privileged terms with
governments that enjoy discretionary power. Thus, this paper contributes an important
qualification to existing theories of foreign investment risk. Second, our empirical evidence
lends some support to the idea that state ownership moderates perceptions of risk and tends
to magnify the preference for governmental discretion and macroeconomic uncertainty in
the host country, though only in the case of partially privatized firms. These findings offer a
more nuanced explanation of the effects of economic and political risk on the decisions of
firms in regulated industries that goes beyond the conventional argument that less risk is
always preferable.
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Table 1: Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in Latin America, 1987-2000

Number of FDIs
78
Argentaria (formerly Banco Exterior de España, BEX)
5
Banesto
2
BBVA (formerly Banco de Bilbao)
23
Banco Central Hispanoamericano (formerly Banco Central)
13
Banco de Fomento
0
Banco Hispano Americano
0
Bankinter
0
Banco Pastor
0
Banco Popular Español
0
BSCH (formerly Banco Santander)
35
Banco de Vizcaya
0
Banco Herrero
0
Banco Zaragozano.
0
Water
11
Aguas de Barcelona (Agbar)
11
Electricity
50
Hidrocantábrico
1
Endesa
16
Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña (Fecsa)
0
Hidroeléctrica Española (Hidrola)
0
Iberdrola (formerly Iberduero)
12
Compañía Sevillana de Electricidad
0
Unión Fenosa
21
Petroleum and Gas
30
CEPSA
2
Gas Natural
6
REPSOL
22
Telecommunications
21
Telefónica
21
Banking

Total FDIs

190
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 4198 firm-country-years, 14 firms, 21 countries, 1987-2000)
1. Number of investments in
firm-country-year
2. Policy instability

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

.04

.25

-.02

.25

-.05***

.08

.87

.03†

-.09***

.03

.16

-.03†

.06***

.03*

.22

.42

.02

.01

.00

-.09***

.02

.42

.04*

-.03*

.48***

-.01

.08***

-.00

.12

-.02

.48***

-.04*

.01

-.07***

-.08***

.01

.13

-.01

-.01

.15***

.29***

-.02

-.00

.00

.00

.04

-.01

.18***

-.02

.24***

-.02

-.00

.00

-.10***

.83

.37

.08***

-.32***

-.04*

-.19***

.03†

-.01

-.14***

-.03*

-.09***

41798.2

40571.9

.12***

-.11***

-.05***

-.04*

.20***

-.01

-.06***

-.01

-.01

.17***

3.45

6.46

.15***

-.17***

-.07***

-.09***

-.07***

-.02

-.05**

-.02

-.02

.21***

.58***

7.15

1.50

.15***

-.23***

.08***

-.01

-.01

.04*

-.11***

-.00

-.05**

.14***

.03†

.04**

2.98

4.14

.07***

-.16***

-.03*

-.03†

.02

-.02

-.07***

-.00

-.05**

.17***

.02

.02

-.00

2.50

3.88

.05***

-.22***

-.04**

-.09***

-.04*

-.01

-.07***

-.04*

-.05**

.23***

.16***

.25***

-.08***

.24***

61.51

39.02

-.09***

.02

.03†

-.04**

.00

.01

.02

-.02

.01

.12***

.05**

.07***

-.38***

.08***

15

3. Macroeconomic uncertainty
4. Full State ownership
5. Partial State ownership
6. Macroeconomic uncertainty ×
Partial State ownership
7. Policy instability × Partial
State ownership
8. Macroeconomic uncertainty ×
Full State ownership
9. Policy instability × Full State
ownership
10. Market reforms initiated
11. Firm sales
12. Previous firm entries in Latin
America
13. Host country’s GDPa
14. Host country’s GDP growth
15. Host country’s inward FDI
16. Host country’s trade
openness

.53***

*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 † p < .10
a

Mean and std. dev. divided by 100,000,000,000.
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Table 3: Firm fixed-effects negative binomial regressions predicting foreign direct investments
Hypothesis
A
B
C
D
Macroeconomic uncertainty
Policy instability

H1 (-)

-.72*

-1.01**

-1.02**

(-2.40)

(-2.98)

(-3.09)

**

3.20

H2b (+)

(2.97)

(2.17)

(2.28)

.61

.53

-.11

(.12)

(.11)

(-.01)

.66

.66

(.67)

(.79)

*

.65*

Partial State ownership

.75

†

(1.73)

.64

H3 (+)

Partial State ownership
Policy instability × Partial State

2.83*

H2a (-)

Full State ownership

Macroeconomic uncertainty ×

2.83

*

(2.09)

(2.14)

†

1.55†

(1.70)

(1.71)

1.54

H3 (+)

ownership
Macroeconomic uncertainty × Full

1.18

State ownership

(.16)

Policy instability × Full State

2.82

ownership

(.04)
1.64

-.28

-.39

-.39

(.76)

(-.11)

(-.15)

(-.14)

7.05

†

9.15

10.1

10.2

(1.61)

(1.72)

(.63)

(.76)

-.05

-.05

Market reforms initiated
Firm sales

a

-.03

-.05

(-1.47)

(-1.97)

(-1.38)

(-1.55)

-5.94

-7.01

-7.02

(-1.04)

(-1.16)

(-1.19)

.02

.02

.02

(.90)

(.90)

(.91)

*

†

.10

.10†

(1.80)

(1.80)

Previous firm entries in Latin
America
Host country’s GDP

b

-24.5

***

(-3.97)
**

.08

Host country’s GDP growth

(3.13)
.11

Host country’s inward FDI

*

(2.22)
Host country’s trade openness

.05

Notes:

*

.11

(1.98)
.04

†

*

.04

.04*

(2.42)

(1.95)

(2.00)

(2.00)

4198

4198

4198

4198

-502.08

-460.24

-457.25

-457.22

Number of observations
Log likelihood

*

z-scores shown in parentheses beneath regression coefficients.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 † p < .10
a

Coefficient multiplied by 1,000,000.
Coefficient multiplied by 1,000,000,000,000.
All regressions include firm in addition to industry, host-country and year fixed effects.
b

